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Abstract  
Contingency budgets are commonly used by managers to respond to uncertainty and control the project 
within the original cost and schedule targets. However, a variety of project participants with conflicting 
interests creates tensions when it comes to managing the risk contingency escrow account during the 
project development, and divergences often arise over the need for either retaining the unspent 
contingencies for future risk and improved facility, or releasing it as a profit. 
With the purpose of studying the dynamics and main influences involved in the risk contingency 
management process of a Design-Build (DB) project, a System Dynamics (SD) contingency 
management model is proposed to simulate the decision making scenarios under different project 
conditions, and behavioral pressures of senior managers and owners. The model suggests that an 
aggressive proactive risk management practice might be an effective policy for managing the 
contingency budget in a complex Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) project. 
Introduction 
An effective Project Risk Management (PRM) practice is critical to the success of complex projects. A 
PRM process typically helps to predict uncertainty so that risks can be either via preventive actions or 
reacted via ex-post corrective actions. Risk contingency plans are widely used tools and contingency 
funds are usually estimated at the project planning phase and included in the original budgets as escrow 
accounts to be used as a flexibility to manage uncertainties and risks that may deviate the project from 
its original time, cost, and quality objectives. Nonetheless, contingency budgets have to be estimated 
and revised during the course of the project as a continuous and dynamic management process. The 
contingency management process should be emphasized within the project management framework 
with the ultimate goal of protecting the interests of the various project participants, including owners, 
investors, creditors, top managers, and the community. The contingency reserve accounts must not be 
seen only as future costs for unforeseen events, but also as potential opportunities for releasing the 
unspent contingency as a profit or as added improvements to the constructed facility. 
However, the contingency management process is often misunderstood by the majority of project 
managers (PMs) and limited to the task of analyzing risk during the planning phase only. Also, 
conflicts and divergences often arise between PMs, senior managers, and other stakeholders involved 
in the control process over the need for retaining the unspent contingencies for future risk response or 
releasing the excess contingency as a profit and reduced price to the client, such as in the case of target 
cost plus incentive fee type of construction contracts (Weston, 1999). 
While managing a project, it is often challenging for managers to determine if it is safe to allow the 
client to draw from the contingency escrow account of an ongoing project or if it is opportune to 
release as profit a certain amount of past unspent contingency. 
The common sense might suggest a relationship between the project progress and the need for 
maintaining contingency reserves. However, complex projects rarely live up to this pragmatism, and 
PMs’ approaches differ from expectations. In this context, understanding the ways in which managers 
approach the problem of managing the contingency budget is an important issue in order to design and 
implement effective PRM processes. 
Now, despite development over the last decade of international standard guidelines (IPMA 2006; PMI 
2009), scholarly papers and professional practice in the arena of PRM, there is still limited help for 
PMs in improving the contingency management process during the project lifecycle. Most PRM 
literature focuses on the processes of identifying and evaluating contingencies, but little effort has been 
put at understanding the influences of belief and behavior of the persons in charge of managing the 
contingency management process. While the risk planning process is now largely used in most 
organizations and complex projects, formal standard models for the contingency fund management are 
perceived as ineffective and are built ad hoc for specific projects (Kutsch and Hall, 2005). Moreover, 
the literature does not describe how contingencies are managed during the project lifecycle and the 
impacts of different contingency management strategies on project performance are not investigated, 
thus offering little help.  
In order to contribute to overcoming the research gap, the purpose of this paper is to develop a cost 
contingency management model to help PMs understand how to more effectively manage the 
contingency budget during the project lifecycle under the influences of various project participants who 
are willing to either keep an escrow account for dealing with future risks or release the excess 
contingency as a profit for the benefits of owners and corporate performance. In particular, the model is 
developed using systems thinking and System Dynamics (SD). Based on a previous model proposed by 
Ford (2002), the present model adds the managerial influences of the main project participants and 
investigates the behavior of contingency management process over the sequenced but overlapped 
phases of engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) involved in complex DB contracts. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, available literature is presented to set the problem, along 
with a brief recall of the SD theory and presentation of the originating model. Secondly, the research 
methodology adopted for the paper is given together with an overview of the usage of contingency 
budgets in DB contracts. Thirdly, the SD model is presented. Then, a quantitative analysis of the 
model’s simulations is given. Finally, results are discussed with policy recommendations and main 
implications followed by future research directions and conclusion. 
Review of Pertinent Literature 
Cost contingency in complex projects has been a research topic for long. A large share of debate has 
been dealing with proposing and applying suitable methods and techniques for estimating the 
contingency reserve (Idrus et al. 2011; Tseng et al. 2009). The contingency budget can be referred to as 
the amount of money within the cost baseline that is allocated for identified risks that are accepted and 
for which contingent or mitigating responses are developed (PMI 2013). Typically, to avoid deviations 
from the baseline finances (Harper et al. 2014), contingency budgets in complex projects are allocated 
either using qualitative and semi-quantitative techniques (Mak and Picken 2000; Günhan and Arditi 
2007) or probabilistic (Thal Jr. et al. 2010; Khamooshi and Cioffi 2009) and simulation-based methods 
(Sonmez et al. 2007). 
However, just a few contributions are available when it comes to understanding three important 
aspects, namely: the process of managing the contingency during the successive stages of project 
development, the managerial pressures imposed by the project participants, and the dynamic behavior 
of the contingency accumulation and release process. 
As far as the first issue is concerned, Mills (2001) recognizes the importance of systematic risk 
allocation approaches and suggests that risk needs to be identified and managed during the project 
lifecycle and especially during the procurement process. With this regard, Xie et al. (2012) present a 
method based on Value at Risk for project cost contingency updating at project milestones during the 
project execution and for allocating appropriate contingencies at different project phases. Also, Barraza 
and Bueno (2007) state that due to the variable performance nature for a wide range of activities, 
contingencies should not only be properly calculated but also assigned in the budget estimation process 
and wisely controlled during the project execution. To this end, they recommend the Monte Carlo 
simulation approach as a methodology for cost contingency management. Finally, Seyedhoseini et al. 
(2009) debate around the techniques that help select the appropriate risk response actions via an 
application in construction projects. 
With regard to the research area associated to capturing the influences of the various stakeholders 
affecting the contingency management and decision making processes, it has been largely recognized 
that based on their points of view, different project participants construe the characteristic and function 
of contingency differently (Baccarini 2005). However, little contribution is available to help 
understanding such mechanisms. One paper that is helpful for the present work is given by Del Cano 
(2002) who presents a PRM process that has been particularized for construction projects from the 
point of view of the owner and the consultant who may be assisting the owner. Also, the work by 
Osipova and Eriksson (2013) explores the importance of collaboration between the project actors in 
managing risks and investigates the tradeoff between control- and flexibility-oriented risk management 
strategies. 
Lastly, major contributions to the study of the dynamic behavior of the contingency management 
process come from the systems thinking approach and the SD theory applied to project management 
(Lyneis and Ford 2007). 
SD provides powerful concepts and medium to understanding and simulating the complex systemic 
behavior and the dynamic nature of complex projects (Mingers and White 2010). SD models are based 
on the causal feedback loops that either reinforce or balance complex relationship between the system 
variables (Richardson 2011). SD also offers a computer-based simulation environment that allows the 
modeler to graphically represent a system of differential equations and to have the computer do the 
discrete-step computational effort over a preset timeframe (Sterman 2000). The outcome of simulations 
is the set of curve lines that describe the behavior of variables on the time axis. This allows capturing 
the overall dynamics of the system, the influence of independent and dependent variables to the 
problem, and, finally, supporting decision making and testing policy design by making case-scenario 
simulations. 
As part of the SD stream of research, an important work is the dynamic behavioral simulation model by 
Ford (2002). His model is an attempt to understand how managers make budget contingency decisions 
and how these decisions impact the project performance. 
Finally, SD is an opportunity for including the managerial influences since complex systems may 
involve multiple stakeholders and decision makers with conflicting interests for which the SD provides 
viable problem solving tools (Kwakkel and Pruyt 2013). 
Research Framework 
Methodology 
The present research was carried out as follows. 
First, the contingency budget management process was investigated. This was done via an integrated 
analysis of available standards provided by international Project Management recognized associations 
(PMI, IPMA, PMA, etc.) and the pertinent scholarly literature, as reported in the previous section. In 
particular, an analysis of SD literature on contingency management was developed based on the idea 
that it is a consistent and conducive methodology to deal with this topic (Kapsali 2011). A special focus 
was given on the model by Ford (2002), which is the foundation for this work. 
In addition, interviews were conducted with a select panel of experts to understand the managerial 
influences and diverse interests of the project participants. In particular, we interviewed the owners, 
senior managers, and PMs of three major complex EPC projects developed by an international design-
builder with headquarters in Italy who here claims for anonymity. The three projects are to develop 
infrastructure and social facilities, namely: a large hospital building in Italy, a main highway bridge in 
Turkey, and a major hydraulic power plant in Peru. More details cannot be disclosed due to 
confidentiality reasons. Unstructured interviews were conducted during a two-year long PRM training 
campaign during which the authors acted as mentors and consultants to the company for improving and 
implementing a consistent contingency management process. 
Second, the model was developed using the SD methodology (Sterman 2000) as described in the 
literature review section. Compared to the Ford’s model, the most important features newly added to 
the present model are the managerial influences and the EPC phasing. Such components are added with 
the purpose of better understanding the contingency management process and engaging in a 
comprehensive improvement of mental models. On one hand, the proposed model includes the various 
managerial influences to contingency release decision making and diverging interests to the excess 
contingency usage strategies. The Ford’s model contemplates that the contingency decision is totally in 
the hands of the project manager (PM) only. Here, both the senior management and the owner’s 
influences are incorporated. They are the most powerful stakeholders and have adversarial and 
typically contrasting interests to the PM as they oppositely enforce the PM’s decision to release the 
excess contingency as profit. 
On the other hand, the model is developed over the sequenced, but partially overlapped, EPC phases of 
a complex construction project and assumes that the excess contingency is created and managed at the 
end of each phase so that management can direct the surplus budget of each phase to profit or cumulate 
it to the downstream phase. 
Then, to verify for the robustness and sensitivity of the model, various case-scenario simulations are 
run using real data from selected projects. 
Finally, based on select simulation runs, policy-making suggestions are drawn as a contribution to help 
improving contingency management models. 
Contingency usage in DB contracts 
Based on international standards, variations and adjustments to the contract scope of work are allowed 
in DB contracts. In particular, the owner has right to vary the scope of work within the boundaries of 
the contractor’s capability, safety or performance, whereas the contractor may propose value 
engineering solutions to reduce the cost of works (FIDIC 2000). In other words, the owner may seek 
for facility improvements within a certain available budget cap and the contractor’s top management 
may look for increased and early profit from the project to show the investors market of growing value. 
However, the two processes interact and largely modify according to the payment scheme agreed upon 
a DB contract. 
If a lump sum firm fixed price is agreed, no significant interaction is activated between the parties’ 
contingency management processes. In fact, the owner would control that the predetermined levels of 
quality and performance are assured, while the contractor’s savings that can be created out of the 
engineering and procurement phases are just managed through the conflicting perspectives of the PM 
and senior managers. 
However, under the contract conditions of a target price plus incentive fee, the owner, PMs, and senior 
managers interact to negotiate the contingency release (Weston, 1999). In this case, savings created as a 
consequence of design and procurement must be shared between the owner and the contractor: first, the 
release decision must be taken, then if savings are released the owner may order for facility 
improvements for as much as her share of released cost savings. 
The proposed model can be purposely applied to simulate the various situations of a firm-fixed price or 
a cost plus saving-shared fee (Gordon 1994), whereas its use may be limited or inapplicable when pure 
cost plus percent fee or unit price payment schemes are in place. 
The Model 
General structure 
The model developed using the VensimDSS® software can be described as composed of three sections 
associated to the three main EPC development stages of a DB project: each section is linked to the 
downstream stage from engineering to construction via the stock and flow modeling of profit and 
excess contingency allocation. In turn, each section is a modified replication of the Ford’s (2002) 
model with added modeling features of the downstream and upstream flows of excess contingency to 
and from the various stages of an EPC project and the PM’s decision making process under the 
stakeholders’ influences. In particular the model introduces the willingness to use the contingency for 
facility improvement by the PM, the top management pressure to release the excess contingency as 
profit and the owner’s pressure to reallocate the excess contingency downward to improve the facility 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The subsystems 
In turn, each section can be described as composed of four main subsystems, namely: escrow accounts, 
emergencies, schedule control, and facility improvements subsystem, as given in Figure 1 and 
described by Ford (2002), where the structure and detailed description of the subsystems can be found. 
The escrow accounts subsystem describes how contingency funds raise and decrease, and how they are 
dynamically reallocated as a flow of funds between the various contingency spending and releasing 
options. The emergency subsystem replicates the reduction of uncertainty through the rate of discovery 
and resolution of emergencies as a function of the project’s progress. The schedule control subsystem 
models the accumulation of the project’s delay as a function of the ability and speed at which the PM 
adjusts schedule and reduces the time delay, and as a function of the level of managerial acceptance of 
a delayed completion of the project. The facility improvement subsystem reproduces the increase in 
facility value due to the accumulated use of contingency for improvements (Ford 2002). 
Model of the managerial influences on the excess contingency 
In addition, here we model the pressures that senior corporate managers and owners impose on the 
PMs’ decision on how to deal with the surfeit contingency escrow account and the associated process 
of streaming the excess contingency towards successive stages or the profit account.  
Following are the main hypotheses underlying the contingency influence model. During the 
engineering stage, the owner’s attention on the project output is typically very high due to her need for 
compliance between the detailed design and the original requirements and contract specifications. At 
this phase, conflicts arise between owner and contractor because of diverging interests: the owner 
would tend to include all possible improvements to the facility as an effect of careful and generous 
design as risk prevention, while the contractor would seek for savings via alternative design solutions 
and cheaper construction methods (Doloi 2012). At the engineering phase, the pressure imposed by the 
top managers to release the excess contingency as a profit is very high, but so is the pressure by the 
owner to use the potential contingency savings for improved facility. 
During the procurement stage, the PM can secure major savings in buying cheaper materials and 
services, as well as in obtaining large excess contingencies from a timely and careful management of 
subcontractors, suppliers, and supply deliveries. The senior management typically requires that the 
excess contingency is returned as profit, while the owner would seek any contract clause to get 
procurement and supply management savings used for either obtaining a reduced price, if the contract 
allows, or for added facility improvements. However, the PM would try to keep the contingency for 
emergency management and schedule control and, on the other hand, as an added reserve to protect the 
project from most of the risks that typically occur or impact late into the construction period and that 
are likely to jeopardize the expected timely completion and the cost/quality performance tradeoff of the 
project. 
According to these hypotheses, the rate at which the excess contingency at each EPC phase is released 
to profit is modeled as per Equation 1. 
 
Contingency budget released to profit rate = (Excess contingency account/Remaining duration 
of phase)*Top Management Pressure on PM      (Eq. 1) 
 
In Equation 1, the senior management’s pressure on the PM is assumed as a linear factor from 0 to 
100%, with zero indicating no persuasion and 100% the maximum possible influence imposed by 
senior managers on the PM’s decision. 
As a consequence, the rate at which contingency funds are accumulated to the downstream phase’s 
contingency escrow account is complement to the total excess contingency account rate, deducted the 
rate of contingency used for improvements under the owner’s influence as per Equation 2. 
 Excess contingency added to downstream phase rate = Excess contingency account rate – 
Excess contingency released to profit rate – Reallocate the excess to improvement rate  (Eq. 2) 
 
As far as the owner’s influence on the PM’s decision making is concerned, this is modeled in the 
improvements subsystem as per Equation 3: the rate at which the value is added to the facility 
improvement (noted as Vi in Equation 3) equals the use of the contingency for the purpose of 
improvement (ui) times the effect of the project progress on facility improvement efficiency (fi), 
multiplied by the owner’s pressure. The facility improvement efficiency is in turn defined as the ratio 
of value added per dollar of contingency spent on improvement. It can be observed that the value added 
by each dollar of spent contingency decreases as the project activities unfold. 
The owner’s pressure is defined as a dimensionless variable from 0 to 100%. The maximum value of 
100% represents the corresponding influence on cumulating the excess contingency to the facility 
improvements account.  
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These influence relationships are applied to all three EPC sections, and both top management and 
owner’s pressures can be given different values at the various phases in each simulation scenario for 
the purpose of evaluating the different hypotheses and proposing contingency management policies. 
Accordingly, a schematized model of the influences on the contingency management process is given 
in Figure 2. The complete list of equations and the Vensim® model are available as supplemental data. 
 
Figure 2. The contingency budget management influence model 
 Simulations and Findings 
Select simulation case-scenarios 
This section provides some SD simulations and shows their graphical representation: some relevant and 
most informative case scenarios are introduced and discussed. 
To run simulations, the following main assumptions are used to ensure simplicity of analysis. The total 
contingency funds for the three lifecycle stages are assessed and made available at the beginning of the 
project. The decision making time for the PM, referred to as the time to resolve emergencies or adjust 
the schedule, is kept constant along the full lifecycle. The time and cost to solve emergencies is kept 
constant, as well as the unit cost for schedule control. The relative inherent importance of pressure felt 
by the PM is considered same and constant over time regardless whether it comes from the owner or 
the senior management. However, for sake of practicality, the model may run under more realistic 
conditions such as variable time to make decisions or adjustments. 
Also, based on the study of the select three actual case projects, the EPC phases are assumed as 
partially overlapped. In particular, the case projects under consideration have similar approximate 
duration and sequencing as per the following. The engineering phase lasts for the first half of the 
project duration (24 months). After 8 months, the procurement process begins until almost the end of 
the project so that it results to be largely overlapped with construction. The construction process then 
starts when the engineering duration is 50 percent complete and it goes on until the project completion. 
Simulations run for as long as 48 months which is the average length of the case projects.  
Also, to reflect the PMs’ behaviors during the lifecycle of the case projects, the PM’s willingness to use 
the risk contingency for schedule control is assumed as a stepped constant; increasing at each 
successive stage, such as 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 during the engineering, procurement, and construction phases 
respectively. These figures are assumed to be a good numerical representation of the escalating 
schedule slippage that PMs face in real life scenarios and, in particular, in our three selected cases. In 
fact, as far as the project activities and phases unfold, the project tends to cumulate unforeseen delays 
that require spending the excess contingency to be recovered. 
The values to these variables can be entered directly by the user in the modeling software interface so 
that a base scenario is created. Then, using all these assumptions and their associated input data as 
described above, some relevant and informative case-scenarios are presented in the following sub-
sections with different levels of stakeholders’ pressures in order to test the contingency management 
influence model and draw potential policy implications. The case-scenarios are obtained by running 
multivariate simulations using the theoretical input data given in Table 1 that represents the level of 
managerial pressure imposed by the stakeholders on the PM and the willingness of the PM to use the 
contingency for substantial improvement to the facility. 
 
Table 1. Input influence variables for select relevant case scenario simulations 
 
According to Table 1, four hypothetical case-scenarios can be described as follows. 
First case-scenario: high willingness to improve the facility and low owner’s pressure 
The first case-scenario intends to simulate a steady and quite high predisposition of the PM to make 
substantial improvements and additions to the constructed facility at all three stages of the project 
development. Under such scenario, the owner does not press to the improvement objective (10%) and 
the top management pressure to release excess contingency increases as far as the project tasks unfold, 
shifting from an initial 10% to a final 90% of the maximum managerial influence to release the excess 
contingency as profit. This scenario does not represent any conflicting pressure from the opposite 
stakeholders due to lower owner’s pressure. Figure 3 presents the cumulative amount of excess 
contingency that is released as profit under such conditions at the three EPC stages. It is shown that 
little contingency is released during the engineering process, while a large portion of the margin is 
made available by converting the risk contingency into profit during the procurement phase, likely due 
to major cost savings created via materials and supply optimizations, and the very last portion of the 
construction period, when PM becomes confident that not all the contingency will be spent for dealing 
with unexpected risk as per the upcoming successful completion of the project. 
 
Figure 3. Amount of excess contingency released as profit under case-scenario 1 
 
Second case-scenario: medium willingness to improve the facility and decreasing owner’s 
pressure 
The second case-scenario simulates a non-conflicting situation with decreasing owner’s pressure and 
increasing top management pressure as the project progresses. This means that the owner’s influence is 
greater than the senior management pressure during the engineering step, while the senior 
management’s pressure becomes more influencing during the construction stage. This scenario is tested 
under a medium level of willingness of PM to make improvements to the constructed facility. The non-
conflicting nature of this scenario is due to shifting balance in pressure by owner and top management 
with a constant PM’s willingness to use contingency for facility improvement. Figure 4 reports the 
associated simulation graphs. 
 
Figure 4. Amount of excess contingency released as profit under case-scenario 2 
 
In particular, it shows that the initial influence of the owner to add substantial improvements to the 
design/engineering of the facility leads to reduced accumulation of released contingency at the 
procurement level and in total a lower level of contingency is transformed into profit, even if the PM 
has little predisposition to make improvements to the facility. 
Third case-scenario: high willingness to improve facility and high owner’s pressure 
Third scenario simulates the strategic alignment between the PM and the owner: high owner’s pressure 
during the total lifecycle is imposed under a high PM’s willingness to make improvements. This leads 
to a large use of contingencies for facility improvement and careful project management to meet the 
quality and time targets, but little attention is in turn routed to making profit for the company. 
However, a conflicting and mounting senior manager influence to release the excess contingency as 
profit has been enforced. With progressive phases, the top management is getting weary of alliance 
between the PM and owner who are making maximum utilization of contingency over the project. As a 
result, Figure 5 shows that a large portion of the contingency is spent for emergency management, 
schedule control and facility improvement to mitigate and prevent future risk with the purpose of 
assuring a successful, timely and improved completion of the project. However, the imposed senior 
management stress would tend to maintain a steady conversion into profit of a limited, but sure, 
unspent contingency. This appears to be a conservative management practice leading to lower but sure 
profit: an acceptable low risk, although low profit tradeoff. 
 
Figure 5. Amount of excess contingency released as profit under case-scenario 3 
 
Fourth case-scenario: low willingness to improve facility and high owner’s pressure 
Finally, the fourth case-scenario simulates a low willingness to use the contingency for the facility 
improvement and strong owner’s pressure conflicting with the high pressure forced by top 
management. In this situation, there is no a strategic alliance between the PM and the senior 
management at ensuring maximum profit in the form of unspent contingency. However, the high 
owner’s pressure causes a decision making dilemma. The associated Figure 6 shows that senior 
managers’ influence prevails due to being reconciled with the PM’s predisposition to avoid using too 
much contingency for schedule control and facility improvements. As a consequence, most of the 
contingency is released as profit since the engineering stage to provide for the greatest benefits at the 
corporate level. However, this ends in no more profit released at the construction phase, because it is 
likely that the little remaining contingency will be mostly used for emergency and schedule control 
during the construction period. In other words, no improvement is made since the beginning as risk 
prevention creates conditions for expensive reactive risk management at the end of the project. 
 
Figure 6. Amount of excess contingency released as a profit under case-scenario 4 
 
Comparison of case-scenarios and interpretation of results 
Some considerations arise from comparing the proposed four case-scenarios and, particularly, from 
analyzing the different profit accumulation profiles as illustrated in Figure 7. Nevertheless, the various 
influence models do not only affect the contingency accrual and release process, but also shape the 
PRM strategies. 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of profit release profiles in the four different case scenarios 
 
Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 can be considered as applications of various risk-aggressive active strategies, 
while scenario 4 is an example of a conservative passive PRM policy. 
In the first case-scenario, the PM drives an aggressive strategy. Here, profit is accumulated mostly 
during the procurement period as a result of spontaneous engineering/design improvements activated 
by the PM in a way that the contingency is largely spent for design improvements even if not forced or 
specifically requested by an active owner pressing to that objective. This is then reflected into 
advantages and major savings that a careful engineering activity drives into the procurement task. As a 
lesson learnt, in such active option a careful engineering phase is a risk mitigation policy to protect 
against future risks. In particular, a large portion of the engineering contingency is spent to improve the 
project as a risk prevention and flexibility to minimize future risks that may occur late into the project. 
The second case-scenario is also an example of an aggressive strategy driven by an active owner 
imposing high pressure to use the contingency for improving the facility and mitigating future risks via 
expensive design solutions and risk preventive actions, regardless whether risk will occur or not. The 
simulation indicates that the owner should trigger responsible influence at the beginning of the project, 
i.e. during the design/engineering phase, while pressures made later into the project execution become 
less effective and somehow counterproductive. 
Then, the third case-scenario is an example of an overactive strategy led by both the PM and the owner, 
aligned to the goal of improving the facility and activating expensive preventive risk management 
practices through spending a large portion of the estimated contingency since the engineering period. 
This case-scenario drives very low risk due to a lot of spending of the contingency for prevention and 
mitigation all along the lifecycle. But this also results in very little profit released with corresponding 
limited benefits provided to the corporate economic performance. It can be interpreted that the facility 
improvements are shared and distributed along the project both as flexibility against future risk, but 
also as a way to maintain good contract relationship and strategic alignment with a very demanding 
owner. 
Out of these three scenarios, the first one provides for the greatest released profit: the autonomous 
predisposition of the PM to use contingencies for improvements as a self-directed risk-mitigating 
preventive strategy appears to be fruitful later into the project and able to reduce later risks so that the 
contingency is progressively released as profit. The proactive option when the PM, with little 
influences imposed by senior managers and owners, activates levers of early risk prevention to reduce 
expensive late risk reaction is suggested as an appropriate “worse-before-better” contingency release 
management policy (Repenning and Sterman 2001). 
On the contrary, the fourth case-scenario is an example of a passive conservative project management 
policy where risk is ignored at the beginning and then reactively managed later into the course of 
action, if it occurs. In fact, this case-scenario shows that the contingency is not spent during the 
engineering period for improvements, while the majority is released as profit since the very beginning. 
As a consequence, little profit eventually remains because the residual contingency has to be used 
during the construction phase to deal with emergencies and react to unexpected risk. This conservative 
strategy may then jeopardize the successful completion of the project and lead to major cost overruns 
and time delays accumulated by the end of the project execution. In other words, such risk reactive 
response strategy would not play a role in mitigating the negative impact of project risks (Miller and 
Lessard, 2001). 
Practical application 
In order to help more practically understand how stakeholders’ pressures affect the contingency release 
process, the work is supplemented with a comparison of the model case-scenarios with the three actual 
case projects that were used in developing the model and making some of its assumptions. All three 
projects are DB contracts reimbursed based on a target price, with sharing of savings and right for the 
owner to request improvements using the shared released savings. Apart from ease of data collection, 
these specific case studies are selected due to their alignment with the four simulation case-scenarios 
previously explained. Such a demonstration helps draw practical implications of the study. A summary 
version of the following discussion is presented in Table 2. 
The first case-scenario simulation can be easily compared to the healthcare facility constructed in Italy. 
Here, a proactive predisposition of the project team to propose and implement substantial design and 
procurement improvements to the facility led to major profits during the final construction phase. 
Improvements were made through the usage of savings created from value engineering options. At that 
time, the company was running quite well on the stock market and there was no need to release early 
profit from that project. The focus of senior management was then more on quality improvements that 
might help make profit on a later stage. This is an aggressive approach comparable to simulation 
scenarios 1 and 2 aimed at improving the constructed facility. 
The second simulation applies to the Turkish bridge case project, where a demanding owner requested 
the contractor to undergo an important redesign of the construction technique to produce savings that 
could be used to build some extra infrastructure for connection of the bridge to the local road network. 
This allowed the owner to get added work within the allocated public budget. However, this change of 
design strategy could not allow the DB contractor to be confident about the future cost performance of 
the project. Eventually, the project experienced significant cost overrun that had to be recovered via the 
usage of the remaining procurement and construction phases’ contingency. In turn, very little profit was 
net out of that originally planned. This case project is comparable to simulation scenarios 3 where high 
owner’s pressure is complimented by equally cooperating PM. 
Finally, Scenario #4 is a good approximate replication of what happened to the Peruvian hydropower 
plant project. For that project, based on both the owner and senior management pressures to obtain 
early benefits from the project, the original engineering contingency was fully released because no 
extra design efforts were carried out and the owner did not order for extra works with their share of 
savings. However, during the procurement and construction phases, several risk events occurred that 
required the usage of the remaining contingency. Eventually, the project closed out with a much lower 
level of profit than expected. 
 
Table 2. Summary version of practical case projects 
Discussion and Implications 
PMs look for policies that improve project profitability under uncertain conditions of risk and seek for 
risk management and project control practices that combine project robustness with the ability to 
perform well across a range of uncertain conditions (Lyneis and Ford 2007). The proposed model is a 
contribution to respond to this challenge and an attempt to help improve the way the contingency 
budget process is managed and understand how it impacts on the project outcomes based on different 
strategic options of PRM policy. 
Moreover, the model introduces the multiple influences of the main project participants into the 
problem, and suggests that the PM should activate different PRM and contingency management 
policies based on the combination of often conflicting pressures to either do preventive risk-mitigating 
facility improvements or releasing the remaining contingency as savings. 
In particular, it is suggested that a viable strategy that maximizes profitability is for the PM to 
proactively engage into substantial project improvements and added design flexibility at the beginning 
of the engineering stage in order to limit the late influences of the owner, who will find herself satisfied 
with the early improvements, and then still allow for a late disclosure of profit under the increasing 
pressure of senior managers. Moreover, this proactive project management strategy is likely to produce 
the same profit level as an opposite conservative strategy that would seek to maximize profit at the 
beginning via savings created with an optimized engineering, reduced constructive design cost estimate 
and cheaper procurement. 
Usually, PMs can choose between better performance with fragility, as the conservative strategy 
suggests, or lower performance with robustness, as an aggressive contingency management strategy 
provides (Repenning 2000). However, the influence model proposed in this paper suggests that the two 
strategies cumulate the same level of profit performance so that the aggressive strategy may prove itself 
to be the recommended tradeoff for managing the contingency budget process along the project 
development. According to the classification of PRM approaches by Pich et al. (2002), the aggressive 
contingency management policy is an instructionist strategy that spends the contingency budget 
according to plans established from the outset combined with some flexibility to adapt and learn from 
unforeseen events. In other words, the preventive strategy can help achieve a balance between control 
for managing risk that has been identified and enough contingency budget flexibility for dealing with 
later unforeseen events (Osipova and Eriksson 2013). 
This work and associated lessons learnt originate both theoretical and practical implications. 
From a research perspective, this paper is a first contribution to analyze the stakeholders’ behavior into 
the contingency management decision making process with a systemic approach. In particular, it 
integrates a previous SD model with the stakeholders’ influences and enforcements on the PM’s 
decisions on how to use the excess contingency, so that it stimulates research around the effects of 
multiple decision makers on PRM practices and behaviors, and their associated impacts on project 
performance. It also engages researchers into the application of SD modeling and simulation in 
complex EPC projects and allows framing the application of contingency management models into 
phased projects. It also stimulates potential discussion around the dominance of preventive contingency 
management proactively-aggressive strategies versus reactively-conservative strategies. 
For managers, owners and practitioners, this work is an opportunity to improve the knowledge around 
these PRM strategic options and to learn how to manage contingencies more effectively while 
developing their projects. In fact, it has been recognized that the key role of controlling cost 
contingency during the project execution is one of the main activities of the PM nowadays (Barraza and 
Bueno 2007). To help in this task, the model can then be used as a simulation-based decision support 
tool for PMs to test various case-scenarios and select the most desirable project risk response strategy 
(Zhang and Fan 2013), and plan or react to the influences that they are likely to receive on their 
projects while making decisions around the usage of the excess contingency. In turn, the model is 
suggested as a communication methodology for all involved participants to better manage risk 
contingencies in a shared way, to align the diverging interests in managing contingency accounts, and 
better integrating the perspective of the owner, project teams and senior corporate managers to improve 
impacts and project economic performance. 
The model also bears some limitations inherent with its assumptions. First, it does not include other 
stakeholders in the influence models, such as investors, lending institutions and the involved 
communities that can have a large impact on the contingency usage patterns. Second, the owner’s and 
senior managers’ pressures are identified as theoretical variables ranging from 0 to 1, but no 
representation of the real risk factors and their associated perceptions is introduced into the model, 
including design, construction, financial, and context risks.  
Conclusion 
This work proposes a contingency management dynamic model that allows simulating the influences of 
the main stakeholders over the contingency budget management process and explores the behavior of 
the contingency accumulation and release over the phases of a DB project, in particular under the 
sequenced phases of EPC. 
The model is suggested to apply not only as a simulation tool for contingency decision making, but also 
to act as a communication method between various stakeholders regarding their policies in complex 
situations such as contingency release and decision-influencing. The model seems fit for complex EPC 
projects in a variety of construction fields where projects are burdened by complex decision making 
structures, such as in large infrastructure, real estate, and petrochemical applications. 
However, the model still needs to address some future research issues. On one hand, its performance in 
other complex project realms, such as information technology, manufacturing, services, etc. is yet to be 
tested. However, it is believed that the inbuilt sophistication will allow for seamless integration into 
these project types with minor modifications in the model. 
On the other hand, an interesting extension would be to add more stakeholders, such as investors and 
lenders, as well as to introduce the originating risk factors that motivate the different managerial 
influences into the contingency release decision. 
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